State of Utah v. Lori Smith : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
State of Utah v. Lori Smith : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Margaret R. Lindsay; attorney for appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; attorneys for appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Smith, No. 20040967 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5357
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
LORI SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: CaseNo.20040967-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT, UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, FROM A CONVICTION OF MISDEMEANOR CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE VIOLATIONS BEFORE THE HONORABLE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
APPEALS DIVISION 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Counsel for Appellee 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766) 
99 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1895 
Orem, Utah 84059-1895 
Telephone: (801) 764-5824 
Counsel for Appellant 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
APR 13 2005 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 3 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT 
SMITH'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION WAS NOT VIOLATED 
BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT "IN CUSTODY" 
FORMRANDA PURPOSES 8 
POINT II ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 
CONCLUSION THAT SMITH'S CONSENT TO 
SEARCH WAS VOLUNTARY AND NOT THE 
PRODUCT OF COERCION OR DURESS 26 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 28 
ADDENDA 30 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (R. 69-75) 
Ruling on Motion to Suppress (R. 49-59) 
Preliminary Hearing Transcript (R. 94) 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutory Provisions 
United States Constitution, Amend. V 1, 3, 8,15,25, 28 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 1 
Cases Cited 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) 9,18 
Layton City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213 (Utah App. 1991) 21-23 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) .. 1,3,4, 7-9, 
12,14,15,18,21,25,26 
Rhode Islandv. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,100 S.Ct. 1682,64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) 21-24 
Salt Lake City v. Corner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983) . . . 9,10,12,13,15-17,19,20,25 
State v. Alfred, 2002 UT App 291, 55 P.3d 1158 1,8 
State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 1998) 1, 17 
State v. Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862 (Utah App. 1997) 26 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,63 P.3d 650 2,26-28 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 8 
State v. Levin, 2004 UT App 396,101 P.3d 846 1,13 
State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996) 9, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 23, 24 
State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) and 503 U.S. 
914,112 S.Ct. 1282,117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992) 25 
State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 (Utah App. 1993) 9 
State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 1994) 2 
Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) 25 
i i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
LORI SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20040967-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Smith's incriminating statements were 
not obtained in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment and Miranda v. 
Arizona"? "In reviewing the trial court's denial of [Defendant's] motion to suppress, we 
examine the underlying factual findings for clear error, and review the trial court's 
conclusions of law based thereon for correctness." State v. Alfred, 2002 UT App 291, f 8, 
55 P.3d 1158 (citation omitted). See also, State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998). 
"Whether given the underlying facts, [Smith] was in custody for Miranda purposes is a 
question of law [this Court reviews] for correctness." State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 81 
(Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 83 (Utah 1983).1 
lrThis Court recently applied a different standard of review in State v. Levin, 2004 UT 
App 396, % 7,101 P.3d 846: "[B]ecause the determination of custody is fact-sensitive and 
1 
This issue was preserved in Smith's motion to suppress (R. 22-29, 39-44). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the consent to search Smith's purse 
was voluntary and not improperly obtained? When consent to search is at issue, this 
Court "afford[s] little deference to the district court" in order to promote state-wide 
standards to guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 
125, ^ 26, 63 P.3d 650 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,937-38 (Utah 1994), and State 
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1271 (Utah 1993)). 
This issue was similarly preserved in Smith's motion to suppress (R. 22-29, 39-
44). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Lori Smith appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment of the Fourth 
District Judicial Court after the entry of guilty pleas conditioned upon her right to appeal 
the denial of a motion to suppress. 
'the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex and varying that no rule 
adequately addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out/ we recognize that 
the trial court has a degree of discretion 'unless such determination exceeds established 
legal boundaries.' State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922,929 (Utah App. 1994)" (other citations 
omitted). The Utah Supreme Court recently granted certiorari review in Levin to consider 
the appropriate standard of review in Miranda cases (Case No. 20050001-SC). 
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B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Lori Smith was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on February 
23,2004, with possession or use of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(I); and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(l) (R. 5). 
On March 25,2004, a preliminary hearing was held before Judge Claudia Laycock 
(R. 19, 94). At the close of the hearing, Smith was bound-over for trial upon a finding of 
probable cause (R. 19, 94: 14). 
On April 5,2004, Smith filed a Motion to Suppress (R. 22-29, 39-44). Smith 
asserted that her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when she 
was subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings; and 
that her statements as well as evidence that was subsequently discovered in her purse 
should be suppressed because the search was the result of incriminating statements made 
by Smith during the custodial interrogation (R. 22-29). Smith also argued that the 
consent she gave to the officer to search her purse was invalid and improperly obtained 
and therefore, all evidence obtained as a result of the search should be suppressed 
pursuant to the exclusionary rule (R. 39-44). 
On July 7, 2004, the trial court denied Smith's motion to suppress (R. 48-59). 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law in regards to the denial of the motion were signed 
by the trial court on September 2, 2004 (R. 69-75). The trial court reached the following 
conclusions in denying the suppression motion: 
1. The site of the questioning was not indicative of custody, since the 
defendant was told she could leave. 
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2. When Officer Lunceford first approached the defendant the driver, not 
the defendant was the focus of the investigation. 
3. After noticing signs of methamphetamine use, the officer's focus shifted 
to the defendant. 
4. There was no objective indicia of arrest to show that the defendant was 
in custody. 
5. The length of the questioning was brief and investigatory, not 
accusatory. 
6. The defendant voluntarily stayed at the scene after being informed that 
she was free to leave. 
7. The defendant's freedom was not restricted to the degree of formal 
arrest, so no Miranda warnings were required before the officer spoke with 
the defendant. 
8. The defendant voluntarily consented to the search of her purse 
(R. 70). 
On September 2,2004, Smith entered guilty pleas to attempted possession of 
methamphetamine, a class A misdemeanor, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 
B misdemeanor, conditioned upon her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress 
(R. 76-83, 96: 5-6). 
On October 14,2004, Smith was sentenced to 24 months court probation and was 
ordered to obtain substance abuse treatment, perform 100 hours of community service, 
and pay a fine totaling $790.00 (R. 85-87). 
On November 9, 2004, Smith filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court (R. 
92). 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On February 12,2004, Officer Tony Lunceford of the Mapleton Police Department 
stopped a vehicle for improper lane travel (R. 94: 4-5). Lori Smith was a passenger in the 
vehicle (R. 94: 5). Lunceford retrieved the driver's license and conducted a "routine 
warrants check" (R. 94: 5, 9). 
The driver was arrested after Lunceford discovered an active warrant and was 
placed in the back seat of Lunceford's vehicle (R. 94: 5,9). Lunceford searched the 
vehicle incident to the driver's arrest (R. 94: 5-6). A drug sniff was also done on the car 
by a "canine in the area" (R. 94: 10). No contraband was found in the vehicle (R. 94: 10). 
After the driver's arrest, Lunceford had Smith "step out of the vehicle" (R. 94: 6, 
9). Because it was cold, Lunceford asked Smith after approximately five minutes "if she 
wished to sit in the officer's patrol vehicle, and she said she would" (R. 94: 6, 9). Smith 
was then placed in the back of a Springville officer's vehicle (R. 94: 10). Lunceford 
testified that the rear door in his police vehicle cannot be opened from the inside, 
however, he was not sure about the vehicle belonging to the Springville officer "but [he] 
would dare say no" (R. 94: 10). Lunceford testified that generally the rear (back seat) 
door of a patrol vehicle is inoperable from the inside (R. 94: 10). 
Lunceford testified that it took 20-25 minutes from the original arrest through the 
complete search of the vehicle (R. 94: 10). 
When asked if he noticed anything unusual about Smith that caused him concern, 
Lunceford testified that Smith seemed "somewhat nervous. Her movements were quite 
fast. I noticed some sores on her face not quite scabbed over. Just things I found 
consistent with certain types of drug usage" (R. 94: 6). 
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When asked if he ever informed Smith that she was free to leave, Lunceford 
replied: "Most of the time I said, 'If you want to walk, you're welcome to go at any time.' 
Th only time I didn't is in between when he was arrested and between the time the vehicle 
was searched, in case illegal items were found" (R. 94: 12). When Lunceford was 
subsequently asked the same question, he replied: "I wouldn't say I just came out and 
said, 'You're free to go.' I said, 'We're conducting an investigation, and we're going to 
search the car, and when you can make phone calls, when we're done here, we can 
transport you to wherever you need to go'2 (R. 94: 13). Lunceford also checked on Smith 
2-3 times during the length of the stop and search (R. 94:13). 
After the driver had been arrested and the vehicle had been searched, Lunceford 
explained to Smith that "nothing was found in the vehicle" and informed her that she had 
"the option of making phone calls" (R. 94: 11). When Lunceford spoke with Smith, he 
was standing outside the Springville patrol car and she was inside the vehicle (R. 94: 11). 
When asked about his conversation with Smith, Luncefored testified: 
I asked her after the arrest had been completed and the driver had been 
placed in my vehicle, if there was anybody we could call. She was allowed 
to use her cell phone, while she was in the car, to call people. I asked her if 
she wanted to walk back to the house where she was at. She said she had 
tried to call and there was no answer. They wouldn't answer the door if she 
went there. During that time I asked her, with my observations. If she had 
used methamphetamine. And she stated, "No." I then asked her again, 
explained my experience with it, and asked her if she hadn't or knew if 
2Smith was not allowed to take the vehicle after the driver's arrest because it was not 
registered in her name (R. 94: 13). 
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there was any in the vehicle or on her. And she said, "There's some in my 
purse." I then asked her, "What was in her purse." And she stated, "Meth" 
(R. 94: 6-7,11). Lunceford then asked Smith to exit the vehicle (R. 94: 7). 
Lunceford then searched Smith's purse with her consent and found a glass pipe 
with burnt residue and a small baggy of a crystal substance that tested positive for 
methamphetamine at the jail (Id.). 
Lunceford did not read Smith her Miranda rights (R. 94: 12). 
Lunceford was in uniform and carrying a sidearm during his interactions with 
Smith (R. 94: 12-13). The lights on his car and the Springville back-up vehicle were 
activated during the stop (R. 94: 13). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Smith's motion to suppress. The trial court 
incorrectly concluded that Smith was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes. 
Accordingly, Smith's incriminating statements must be suppressed. In addition, because 
it was those statements which led to the discovery of evidence in her purse, that evidence 
must also be suppressed because it was obtained as a direct result of the unlawful 
questioning. Alternatively, the evidence found in Smith's purse must be suppressed 
because the consent she gave to the officer to search her purse was involuntary and the 
result of coercion or duress. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT 
SMITH'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION WAS NOT VIOLATED BECAUSE 
SHE WAS NOT "IN CUSTODY" FOR MIRANDA PURPOSES 
Smith asserts that the trial court incorrectly concluded that she was not "in 
custody" and not subject to interrogation for Miranda purposes when she was detained 
pursuant to a traffic stop and was subsequently questioned about drug usage and 
possession after a search of the vehicle did not result in the discovery of any illegal 
substances without the benefit of Miranda warnings. 
"In reviewing the trial court's denial of [Defendant's] motion to suppress, we 
examine the underlying factual findings for clear error, and review the trial court's 
conclusions of law based thereon for correctness." State v. Alfred, 2002 UT App 291, f 8 
55 P.3d 1158 (citation omitted). See also, State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998). 
"Whether given the underlying facts, [Smith] was in custody for Miranda purposes is a 
question of law [this Court reviews] for correctness." State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 81 
(Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 83 (Utah 1983). 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that 
defendants shall not be "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself/ 
To secure this fundamental right, the United States Supreme Court established 
procedural safeguards that must be followed during custodial interrogation. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Statements elicited by 
police during a custodial interrogation must be suppressed if a defendant has not been 
advised of his constitutional rights per Miranda. State v. Larocco, 19A P.2d 460, 472 
(Utah 1990). 
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Smith asserts that the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that she was not 
"in custody" for Miranda purposes. The standard for determining when a defendant is 
'in custody' for Miranda purposes is well settled. "[T]he safeguards prescribed by 
Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 
'degree associated with formal arrest.'" State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144,1146 (Utah 
1996) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 
L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)). "More specifically, Miranda warnings are required whenever the 
circumstances of an interrogation are such that they 'exert upon [the] detained person 
pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-
incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.'" Mirquet, 914 
P.2d at 1146 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437, 104 S.Ct. at 3149). Additionally, "the 
proper inquiry as to whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda is 
whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would believe his 'freedom of 
action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest.'" State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 
351, 355 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
Utah Courts have repeatedly looked at four key factors in the determination of 
whether a defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes: 1. The site of the interrogation. 
2. Whether the investigation focused on the accused. 3. Whether the objective indicia 
of arrest were present. 4. The length and form of the interrogation. Salt Lake City v. 
Carner, 664 P.2d 1168,1171 (Utah 1983). Whether a defendant is "in custody" for 
Miranda purposes "depends on an objective assessment of the circumstances of the 
interrogation with respect to the compulsory nature of the interrogation rather than on 
the subjective intent or suspicions of the officers conducting the examination." Mirquet, 
914 P.2d at 1147. In concluding that Smith was not in custody for Miranda purposes, 
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the trial court applied these Carrier factors. However, Smith asserts that the trial court 
reached the wrong legal conclusions in her application of the underlying facts. 
1. The Site of the Interrogation 
The trial court concluded that "The site of the questioning was not indicative of 
custody, since the defendant was told she could leave" (R. 70 at <[j 1). In reaching this 
conclusion the trial court found specifically: "Officer Lunceford told the defendant that 
she was 'welcome to go at any time' if she wanted to leave the scene on foot" (R. 73 at 
1|18). However, this finding-while accurate-does not completely encompass the 
underlying factual situation or Officer Lunceford's testimony. 
When asked if he ever informed Smith that she was free to leave, Lunceford's 
actual testimony is as follows: "Most of the time I said, 'If you want to walk, you're 
welcome to go at any time.' Th only time I didn't is in between when he was arrested 
and between the time the vehicle was searched, in case illegal items were found" (R. 94: 
12). This testimony establishes that Lunceford would not let Smith leave while the 
vehicle was searched in case any illegal contraband was located. 
However, prior to the search of the vehicle, Lunceford's interaction with Smith 
was limited: Lunceford pulled over the vehicle for improper lane travel. He retrieved 
the driver's license and ran a routine warrants check on the driver. He arrested the 
driver pursuant to an active warrant and placed the driver in the back of his patrol car. 
Lunceford then requested that Smith exit the vehicle while a search of the vehicle 
incident to arrest was conducted. See R. 74-75 at ffij 1-8; 94: 4-6, 9-10. 
When Lunceford was subsequently asked the same question, he replied: "I 
wouldn't say I just came out and said, 'You're free to go.' I said, 'We're conducting an 
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investigation, and we're going to search the car, and when you can make phone calls, 
when we're done here, we can transport you to wherever you need to go'" (R. 94: 13). 
Smith also asserts that her interaction with Lunceford after the search of the 
vehicle does not support the trial court's conclusion that "The site of the questioning 
was not indicative of custody, since the defendant was told she could leave" R. 70 at ^ 
1). Smith also asserts that the trial court's similar conclusion that Smith "voluntarily 
stayed at the scene after being informed that she was free to leave" is incorrect (Id. at *f 
6). 
After the driver had been arrested and the vehicle had been searched, Lunceford 
"walked back" and explained to Smith that "nothing was found in the vehicle" and 
informed her that she had "the option of making phone calls" (R. 94: 11). When 
Lunceford spoke with Smith, he was standing outside the Springville patrol car and she 
was inside the vehicle (R. 94: 11). When asked about his conversation with Smith, 
Luncefored testified: 
I asked her after the arrest had been completed and the driver had been placed in 
my vehicle, if there was anybody we could call. She was allowed to use her cell 
phone, while she was in the car, to call people. I asked her if she wanted to walk 
back to the house where she was at. She said she had tried to call and there was 
no answer. They wouldn't answer the door if she went there. During that time I 
asked her, with my observations. If she had used methamphetamine. And she 
stated, "No." I then asked her again, explained my experience with it, and asked 
her if she hadn't or knew if there was any in the vehicle or on her. And she said, 
"There's some in my purse." I then asked her, "What was in her purse." And she 
stated, "Meth" 
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(R. 94: 6-7). At no point during the conversation with Smith after the search of the 
vehicle does Lunceford tell her that she is free to leave. Smith was sitting in the rear of 
a patrol vehicle while Lunceford questioned her and spoke with her through the open 
rear door (R. 94: 11-12). Lunceford is in uniform and carrying a sidearm (R. 94: 12-13). 
Moreover, Lunceford testified that it is "during" the time that he was making inquiry as 
to where Smith wanted to go that he begins questioning her about the use of 
methamphetamine and if she had any drugs on her person or had knowledge of drugs in 
the vehicle (R. 94: 6-7). Smith asserts that these facts simply do not support the trial 
court's conclusion that Smith was not in custody because she was free to leave.3 
While in the context of a routine traffic stop vehicle occupants may not generally 
be "in custody" for Miranda purposes, "there may be occasions when a defendant is 
entitled to a Miranda warning prior to a formal arrest." State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 
1147 (Utah 1996). Thus Utah courts have relied on the factors set forth in Carner to 
guide "the decision as to when one is in custody and entitled to a Miranda warning." Id. 
In Mirquet, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed this Court's ruling that the 
defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes and that the site of the 
interrogation-inside a police car-weighed in favor of that conclusion. 914 P.2d at 1148. 
Mirquet was pulled over for a speeding violation. 914 P.2d at 1145. He subsequently, at 
the invitation of the officer, entered the police vehicle to view the speed reading on the 
radar unit. Id. Both the officer and defendant entered the vehicle. At this point, the 
technically, the "not free to leave" standard which governs whether a person has 
been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes does not govern the issue of whether an 
individual is in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes. See, State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 
1144,1147. Accordingly, Smith will not limit her argument, as to whether the site of the 
interrogation supports a conclusion that she was in custody, to the question of her freedom 
of movement as was done by the trial court. 
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officer detected an odor of marijuana. 914 P.2d at 1146. The officer then confronted the 
defendant and stated: "It's obvious to me you've been smoking marijuana. You know, 
there's no question in my mind. Would you like to go to the car to get the marijuana, or 
do you want me to go get it?" Id. In response, the defendant retrieved the marijuana. 
914 P.2d at 1146. The officer subsequently searched the vehicle and found cocaine, 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Id. 
Smith asserts that the site of the interrogation here-also inside a patrol car while 
the officer stood in the open door-likewise weighs in favor of the conclusion that she 
was in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes particularly when she, too, was 
questioned about drug use and asked about the location of drugs. Cf. State v. Levin, 
2004 UT App 396, ^  14,101 P.3d 846 (Site of interrogation during traffic stop was open 
road "unlike the confines of a police station or cruiser.").4 
2. Whether the Investigation Focused on the Accused 
In regards to the second Corner factor as to whether the investigation focused on 
the accused, the trial court rendered two conclusions: One, that "When Officer 
Lunceford, first approached the defendant the driver, not the defendant was the focus of 
the investigation" (R. 70 at \ 2). Two, that "After noticing signs of methamphetamine 
use, the officer's focus shifted to the defendant" (Id. at \ 3). In her written ruling, Judge 
Lay cock further elaborated on these conclusions: 
Until Officer Lunceford approached defendant as she sat in the back of the 
Sringville officer's patrol car, the focus of the investigation had been the arrest of 
the vehicle and the subsequent search of the vehicle. Although the officer had 
4On April 5, 2005, the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari review in Levin to 
consider the proper standard of review to be used in determining the necessity of Miranda 
warnings (Case No. 20050001-SC). 
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asked defendant to remain during the search, upon completion of the search, 
Officer Luxford approached the defendant where she sat in the patrol car and 
informed her that nothing had been found in the search and that she was free to 
leave. At this point, the officer noticed what he believed were indicia of drug use 
and changed the focus of his investigation to defendant by asking whether she 
used drugs and whether she had any drugs in her possession. Certainly, as he 
talked to her very briefly about possible drug use, the defendant became the focus 
of his investigation. The Court finds that this factor does, indeed, point toward 
the possibility of custodial interrogation 
(R. 53-54). 
Smith asserts mat me trial court was correct in concluding mat mis factor weighs 
in favor of the ultimate conclusion that she was "in custody" for Miranda purposes. 
Additionally, it is not clear from Officer Lunceford's testimony as to what point he 
observed indicia of drug use on the defendant. The State asked the officer if he noticed 
anything unusual about Smith mat caused him concern, Lunceford testified that Smith 
seemed "somewhat nervous. Her movements were quite fast. I noticed some sores on 
her face not quite scabbed over. Just things I found consistent with certain types of drug 
usage" (R. 94: 6). It is unclear from his testimony whether those observations were 
made while Smith was standing outside after being asked to exit the vehicle or if those 
observations were made later while she was in the back of the Spritigville patrol car. 
However, what is abundantly clear from the record is that she was told to remain at the 
scene during the search of the car "in case illegal items were found" (R. 94: 12). Smith 
asserts that there would have been no justification for her to remain at the scene during 
the search if the focus of the investigation was solely on the driver unless Officer 
14 
Lunceford already had observed signs of drug use on her. Moreover, when Lunceford 
began questioning Smith about her drug use he not only asked her whether there were 
drugs on her person, he also questioned her about drugs in the vehicle (R. 94: 6-7). 
Smith asserts that an analysis of this second factor-whether or not she was the 
focus of the investigation-clearly supports the conclusion that she was in custody in 
terms of the Fifth Amendment protections and the necessity of Miranda warnings. See, 
Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1145-46,1147-48 (Defendant focus of investigation when officer 
smelled burnt marijuana on defendant and subsequently questioned him concerning 
location of drugs). 
3. Whether the Objective Indicia of Arrest were Present 
Smith asserts that the third Carner factor also supports the conclusion that she 
was in custody at the time she was interrogated by Lunceford. In regards to this factor 
the trial court concluded: "There was no objective indicia of arrest to show that the 
defendant was in custody" (R. 70 at f 4). Judge Lay cock elaborated on this conclusion 
in her written ruling: 
It is clear that there was an obviouse police presence at the scene of this 
conversation. While Officer Lu[nce]ford was questioning the defendant, he was 
dressed in uniform and wore a sidearm; in addition, the flashing lights of all the 
patrol cars were turned on. However, at the time he began questioning defendant 
about possible drug use, the visual factors listed above had everything to do with 
the driver's arrest and nothing to do with defendant. She had just been informed 
that, despite the flashing lights and the officer's presence, she was free to leave. 
At that point, none of the factors in play constituted custodial or control tactics 
over the defendant. In Salt Lake City v. Carner, the court described the indicia of 
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arrest as "readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns." 664 P.2d 1168,1171 
(1983), In addition, the "environment may have been authoritative but it 
certainly was no coercive or compelling." Id. Clearly none of these indicia 
attended Officer Lu[nce]ford's questioning of defendant, as defendant was not 
placed in handcuffs or guarded by other officers, she was told she was free to 
walk away from the scene and her movements were physically unrestricted. The 
Court finds that there were no objective indicia of arrest that support a finding 
that defendant was in custody 
(R. 52-53). Smith asserts that the trial court's conclusion in regards to the presence of 
objective indicia of arrest is not incorrect. 
In determining that no objective indicia of arrest were present when Smith was 
questioned about drug use and possession, the trial court relied heavily on the notion 
that Smith had been told that she was free to leave and thus ignore the flashing lights of 
multiple police vehicles and the presence of several uniformed and armed officers. 
However, Lunceford admitted that he never "came out and said, 'You're free to go'" (R. 
94: 13). In addition, Lunceford clearly testified that he had told Smith not to leave while 
the vehicle was searched R. 94: 12, 13). The trial court concluded that Smith's 
movements were "physically unrestricted" (R. 52). Smith asserts that this conclusion is 
clearly incorrect because Smith was not allowed to leave while the vehicle was 
searched-even though she had the use of her phone and accepted the offer to sit in the 
back of the Springville patrol car because it was cold. Moreover, when Smith was 
questioned she was sitting inside the back seat of a patrol car while the officer stood in 
the vicinity of the open door frame to communicate with her (R. 94: 11-12). 
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Additionally, there was no break in the conversation between the time when 
Lunceford questioned Smith about where she wanted to go, ox who she wanted to call, 
and when he questioned her about drug use, explained to her his observations, and then 
questioned her about the presence of drugs on her person or in the vehicle (R. 94: 6-7). 
This is supported by Lunceford's testimony that "During that time I asked her, with my 
observations. If she had used methamphetamine...." (R. 94: 7). After Lunceford learned 
from his questioning that Smith had methamphetamine in her purse, he asked her to exit 
the vehicle (R. 94: 7). 
Judge Laycock cited to a fifth factor that has in the past been utilized by Utah 
courts at various times: "whether the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely 
and willingly." Brandley, 972 P .2d at £2 n. 4 (citations omitted). But the Utah Supreme 
Court has indicated that this is really one aspect of the third Carrier factor. Id. 
Accordingly, Smith will analyze this question as part of the larger issue as to the 
presence of objective indicia of arrest. Judge Laycock found that Smith "went to the 
Springville patrol car freely and willingly and also remained in the same car during the 
conversation with Officer Lu[nce]ford equally freely and willing" (R. 51). Smith may 
have chosen to sit in the patrol car. However, her choice was not to sit in the patrol car 
or leave the scene. Her choice-which is supported by Lunceford's testimony-was not to 
leave the scene but to either sit in the patrol car or stand in the cold while the vehicle 
was searched. 
Similarly, the facts do not support the trial court's notion that Smith remained in 
the patrol car during the interrogation by Lunceford "freely and willing." Lunceford 
had a single conversation with Smith in which he questioned her about various things: 
Lunceford informed Smith that nothing was found in the vehicle and that she could 
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make phone calls (R. 94:11). Lunceford asked if "there was anybody we could call." 
He questioned Smith if "she wanted to walk back to the house where she was at." 
Lunceford then questioned Smith about her use of methamphetamine and when she 
replied in the negative, Lunceford "asked her again, explained my experience with it, 
and asked her if she hadn't or knew if there was any in the vehicle or on her. And she 
said, 'There's some in my purse.' I then asked her, 'What was in her purse.' And she 
stated, 'Meth'" R. 94: 6-7). Lunceford testified that he then asked Smith to exit the 
vehicle (R. 94: 7). 
Smith asserts that these facts do not support the trial court's finding that she 
remained freely and willingly. Lunceford engaged in a singe conversation with Smith 
while she sat in the back of the patrol car and he stood by the open door. In this 
conversation Lunceford interrogated Smith about where she would like to go and about 
his articulated suspicions that she had used drugs or if she could produce drugs on her 
person or in the vehicle. 
Custodial interrogation has been defined by the United States Supreme Court as 
"questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct 1602,1612,16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Moreover, this question of 
custody is analyzed under an objective standard: "[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a 
reasonable man in the suspects position would have understood his situation." Berkemer 
v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,442,104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). 
Smith asserts again, that the facts of this case are similar to those in State v. 
Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996). In Mirquet, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed this 
Court's ruling that the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes and that the 
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objective indicia of arrest were present. 914P.2dat 1148. The Utah Supreme Court 
cited this Court's conclusions from application of the Carrier factors and then held that 
"The facts support both these subordinate conclusions and the ultimate conclusion that 
Mirquet was 'in custody.'" Id 
Mirquet was pulled over for a speeding violation. 914 P.2d at 1145. He 
subsequently, at the invitation of the officer, entered the police vehicle to view the speed 
reading on the radar unit. Id. Both the officer and defendant entered the vehicle. At this 
point, the officer detected an odor of marijuana. 914 P.2d at 1146. The officer then 
confronted the defendant and stated: "It's obvious to me you've been smoking 
marijuana. You know, there's no question in my mind. Would you like to go to the car 
to get the marijuana, or do you want me to go get it?" Id. In response, the defendant 
retrieved the marijuana. 914 P.2d at 1146. The officer subsequently searched the 
vehicle and found cocaine, marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Id. 
This Court-in its earlier opinion-elaborated on the presence of objective indicia 
of arrest for Mirquet: "The third factor, whether the objective indicia of arrest were 
present, neither compels a determination of custody nor is completely devoid of some 
indication of custody. Granted there were no 'readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn 
guns,' Carrier, 664 P.2d at 1171, yet defendant was isolated in a patrol vehicle with an 
officer accusing him of a crime. One element of any arrest is going to be such an 
accusation. Another objective indication of arrest can be found in the trial court's 
finding that, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt free to 
leave." State v. Mirquet, 884 P.2d 995, 999 (Utah App. 1992). 
Smith asserts that the objective indicia of arrest are even more visible in her case. 
In Mirquet only one officer was present at the scene. In this case there were multiple 
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officers (presumably uniformed and armed) and multiple vehicles present with activated 
lights. Furthermore, while Smith chose to sit in the back of the vehicle rather than stand 
out in the cold, she was not free to leave the scene. In addition, she had seen the driver 
arrested, hand-cuffed and placed in the back of another patrol car. Furthermore, like 
Mirquet, she was accused of committing a crime while the officer stood in the door 
frame while she remained in the back seat of the patrol car. Smith asserts that under 
these circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. 
4. The Length and Form of Interrogation. 
The fourth Carrier factor concerns the length and form of the interrogation. The 
trial court concluded that: "The length of the questioning was brief and investigatory, 
not accusatory" (R. 70 at \ 5). Smith concedes that the period of interrogation is not 
lengthy. However, Smith asserts that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the 
questioning was only investigatory and not accusatory. 
In Carrier, the Utah Supreme Court held that "An accused must be apprised of his 
Miranda rights if the setting is custodial or accusatory rather than investigatory. In other 
words, at the point the environment becomes custodial or accusatory, a police officer's 
questions must be prefaced with a Miranda warning." Carner, 664 P.2d at 1170. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated further: 
[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is 
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to 
say, the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express 
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than 
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The latter portion of this 
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definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the 
intent of the police." 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01,100 S.Ct. 1682,1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 
(1980). See also Layton City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213,1215 (Utah App. 1991). 
In Rhode Island v. Irmis, 446 U.S. 291,100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), 
the police a detained a murder suspect and read him his Miranda rights. Id. at 294. The 
suspect invoked his rights and asked to speak with a lawyer. Id. The suspect was 
subsequently placed in a police car with three other officers to be driven to the police 
station. Id. 
While en route to the station, two of the police officers began a conversation 
concerning the missing murder weapon. Innis, 446 U.S. at 294. The officers expressed 
concern that handicapped school children frequent the area and "God forbid one of them 
might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves.9' Id. at 294-95. 
Although the conversation did not involve the suspect, he interrupted the conversation 
and told the officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was 
located. Mat 295. 
The police returned the suspect to the scene and again advised him of his 
Miranda rights. Innis, 446 U.S. at 295. The suspect again stated that he understood his 
rights but he "wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the area in the 
school." Id. at 295. He then led the police to where the gun was hidden and was 
subsequently convicted. Id. at 296. 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the suspect was 
"interrogated" by the officers in violation of his right to remain silent under Miranda. 
Innis, 446 U.S. at 298. The Court rejected the notion that interrogation only results from 
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"express questioning" from police officers, but included the use of "psychological 
ploys" and "words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known 
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id. at 299, 302 (emphasis in 
original). 
The Court concluded that the suspect was not subject to interrogation. Innis, 446 
U.S. at 302. Not only was the suspect not subject to express questioning, the 
conversation was "nothing more than a mere dialogue between the two officers to which 
no response from the respondent was invited." Id. The Court also reasoned that the 
officers' conversation was "brief," consisting of "no more than a few offhand remarks" 
which did not establish that police "should have known were reasonably likely to elicit 
an incriminating response." Id. at 303. 
In Latyon City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213 (Utah App. 1991), police responded to a 
domestic violence call and found the defendant standing next to a car with its engine 
running. Id. at 1213-14. The defendant smelled strongly of alcohol and refused to 
identify himself. Id. at 1214. The defendant also shouted obscenities to the police and 
tried to fight the police. Id. The police arrested the defendant for disorderly conduct and 
then placed him in a patrol car. Id. 
The police then began to speak with others present at the scene to discuss the 
reported violence between the defendant and his wife. Aragon, 813 P.2d at 1214. His 
wife mentioned that the defendant had driven to the scene, but another neighbor 
disputed this and said that she saw a friend driving the defendant. Id. One officer then 
approached the defendant and asked, "Where is the other person that was in the car with 
you, since I need to talk to him." Id. The defendant answered, "There wasn't anyone 
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else with me ... I was alone when I drove here. I just got here three or for minutes ago." 
Id. The defendant had not been advised of his Miranda rights. Id. 
This Court discussed the meaning of "interrogation" outlined in Innis, and 
observed that "Ascertaining the likelihood of incrimination under the circumstances of a 
specific situation is a factual determination." Aragon, 813 P.2d at 1215. This Court then 
unequivocally concluded that this questioning was "so likely to evoke an incriminating 
response that it constituted interrogation for purposes of Miranda." Id. at 1216. 
Smith asserts again that this case is even more similar to that of State v. Mirquet, 
914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996). In Mirquet, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed this Court's 
ruling that the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes and that the objective 
indicia of arrest were present. 914 P.2d at 1148. The Utah Supreme Court cited this 
Court's conclusions from application of the Corner factors and then held that "The facts 
support both these subordinate conclusions and the ultimate conclusion that Mirquet was 
'in custody.'" Id. 
Mirquet was pulled over for a speeding violation. 914 P.2d at 1145. He 
subsequently, at the invitation of the officer, entered the police vehicle to view the speed 
reading on the radar unit. Id. Both the officer and defendant entered the vehicle. At this 
point, the officer detected an odor of marijuana. 914 P-2d at 1146. The officer then 
confronted the defendant and stated: "It's obvious to me you've been smoking 
marijuana. You know, there's no question in my mind. Would you like to go to the car 
to get the marijuana, or do you want me to go get it?" Id. In response, the defendant 
retrieved the marijuana. 914 P.2d at 1146. The officer subsequently searched the 
vehicle and found cocaine, marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Id. 
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In this case, Smith, too, entered the police vehicle at the invitation of the officer 
after she was told she could not leave while the vehicle was searched. Like the officer 
in Mirquet-who smelled burnt marijuana on the defendant-Officer Lunceford saw 
indicia of drug use on Smith including sores on hef face. Lunceford, too, confronted 
Smith with his observations and asked her if "she had used methamphetamine. And she 
stated, "No." I then asked her again, explained my experience with it, and asked her if 
she hadn't or knew if there was any in the vehicle or on her. And she said, "There's 
some in my purse." I then asked her, "What was in her purse." And she stated, 
"Meth"(R. 94: 6-7). 
Smith asserts that, like Mirquet, she was confronted by an officer "who made a 
direct accusation of illegal conduct" and that this case "does not involve an unarticulated 
suspicion" focused on her but rather an accusation by an officer in which he "explicitly 
stated his conclusion of illegal conduct" and in effect, directed her to incriminate herself 
and retrieve any incriminating evidence from her person or the vehicle. See Mirquet, 
914 P.2d at 1147,1148. Smith asserts that she was "subjected to either express 
questioning or its functional equivalent." Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-
90. See also, State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 971 (Utah App. 1993). The United States 
Supreme Court has defined "functional equivalent" as "Any words or actions on the part 
of the police (other man those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. 
The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the 
suspect, rather than the intent of the police." Id. At the very least Smith was subjected 
to the functional equivalent of express, accusatory questioning. As such, she was 
entitled to receive the benefit of Miranda warnings prior to being so interrogated. 
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Smith asserts that the trial court erred in its ultimate conclusion that she was not 
"in custody" under the Fifth Amendment. Smith asserts that all four factors set forth in 
Carner weigh in favor of a conclusion that she was in custody and was, therefore, 
entitled to receive Miranda warnings prior to being interrogated and confronted with 
accusations of criminal conduct. 
Smith further asserts that all statements made during this interrogation must be 
suppressed. Additionally, all evidence which was located in her purse, and which was 
discovered because of this coercive custodial interrogation must also be suppressed or 
excluded because this evidence was "obtained either during or as a direct result of an 
unlawful invasion." Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471,485, 83 S.Ct. 407, —, 9 L.Ed.2d 
441 (1963). This Court in State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, cert denied, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991) and 503 U.S. 914,112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992), held that 
"evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment is properly suppressed under 
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" and that courts must exclude "all primary 
evidence elicited during the custodial interrogation and all incriminating evidence 
derived therefrom which is not saved by an exception to the exclusionary rule." 808 
P.2d at 1112,1116 n.27. Smith asserts that as there is no exception to the exclusionary 
rule which applies, all primary evidence must be excluded as fruits of the improper 
custodial interrogation. 
Smith also asserts that the trial court's error of denying her motion to suppress 
statements obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment and Miranda rights was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
"It is well established that the admission of statements obtained in violation of 
Miranda can be harmless error. For federal constitutional error to be held harmless, we 
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must sincerely believe that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862, 867 (Utah App. 1997) (citations and quotations omitted). 
Moreover, "it is not enough that we would find sufficient evidence to support the 
conviction even if the statement is excised from the record. It is inconsequential that a 
retrial will most likely result in a conviction." Id. at 867. The evidence must be "so 
compelling that we can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have 
reached the same verdict without learning of the defendant's] incriminating statement." 
Id. 
The evidence was found in Smith's purse as a direct result of the incriminating 
statements she made to Officer Lunceford during his custodial interrogation. Without 
the incriminating statements-made without the benefit of Miranda warnings—Smith 
asserts there would be no evidence of a crime and that she would not have been charged 
or convicted with possession of methamphetamine or drug paraphernalia. 
POINT II 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED INT ITS 
CONCLUSION THAT SMITH'S CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS VOLUNTARY 
AND NOT THE PRODUCT OF COERCION OR DURESS 
Alternatively, Smith asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that the consent 
to search her purse was voluntarily given and was not improperly obtained. This issue is 
a mixed question of law and fact. However, little discretion is afforded to the district 
court in this matter. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 26, 63 P.3d 650. 
Smith does not dispute that she gave Officer Lunceford consent to search her 
purse. Instead Smith maintains that the search was not voluntary but was the result of a 
prior illegality. "[Voluntariness is a legal conclusion, which is reviewed for 
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correctness." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at If 51 (citations omitted). "The appropriate 
standard to determine voluntariness is the totality of the circumstances test, and the 
burden of proof is by preponderence of the evidence." Id. at % 56 (citations omitted). In 
other words, "the totality of the circumstances must show consent was given without 
duress or coercion." Id. at ^ f 57. 
Factors which may show a lack of coercion or duress are: "1. the absence of a 
claim of authority to search by the officers; 2. the absence of an exhibition of force by the 
officers; 3. a mere request to search; 4. cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 5. the 
absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ^ f 57 
(quoting State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). 
The trial court concluded that Smith's consent to search her purse was voluntary 
(R. 70 at f 8). In reaching this conclusion, Judge Laycock acknowledged that defendant 
had been "sitting in a patrol car and was speaking with a uniformed and armed police 
officer" (R. 50). However, Judge Laycock concluded that Smith's consent to search was 
voluntary because: 
At no time did Officer Lu[nce]ford attempt to deceive or trick defendant into 
giving her consent; he did not threaten that he would search the purse without her 
consent, nor did he threaten her in any other way. He did not claim authority to 
search her purse, but asked permission after defendant admitted what was in the 
purse. The period of questioning was brief and was not demanding, nor were the 
questions repeated. The Court finds through analysis of the above facts and by a 
preponderance of the evidence that defendant did give consent voluntarily 
(R. 50). Smith asserts that Judge Laycock's ultimate conclusion-based upon the totality 
of the circumstances-is incorrect and should be corrected by this Court. 
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In this case-like Hansen-the timing of the officer's request implied that Smith 
could not refuse consent. Multiple officers and patrol cars were present at the scene. 
Smith had previously been detained while the driver of the vehicle was arrested and hand-
cuffed and was also placed in the back-seat of a patrol car. Smith had been told that she 
should remain at the scene while the vehicle was searched. More importantly, Smith had 
just been interrogated about her use of drugs and about the presence of drugs on her 
person or in the vehicle. In response to this interrogation Smith told the officer that there 
was methamphetamine in her purse and he ordered her to exit the vehicle. 
Smith asserts that under these circumstances her consent to search was the result of 
duress, coercion and the product of the custodial interrogation which was conducted in 
violation of her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. Accordingly, she asks 
that this Court correct the erroneous conclusion of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Smith asks that this Court reverse the denial of her motion to suppress. Smith 
also requests that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with instructions 
that she is granted leave to withdraw her guilty pleas, that her statements and all 
evidence is to be suppressed, and that the matter should be dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of April, 2005. 
MargarenP. Li f f . ndsay 
Counsel for Appella 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
LORI SMITH, : Case No. 041400736 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Court, having considered the memoranda and 
arguments of the parties, and being fully informed in this matter 
hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. On February 12, 2004, Mapleton Officer Tony Lunceford (Officer 
Lunceford) pulled over a vehicle after observing at least two 
instances of improper lane travel. 
2. There were two occupants of the vehicle, the driver and the 
defendant, who was a passenger in the front seat of that 
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-- 'U'W-' 
nnn75 
vehicle. 
A routine warrants check of the driver showed that there was 
a valid, outstanding warrant of arrest for him. 
The vehicle was not registered to either the driver or the 
defendant. 
Officer Lunceford arrested the driver pursuant to the warrant 
and placed the driver in the back seat of his patrol vehicle. 
Back-up officers arrived at the scene, including a vehicle 
from Springville. 
Officer Lunceford conducted a search of the vehicle incident 
to the arrest. The officer requested that the defendant exit 
the vehicle while the search was conducted. 
Officer Lunceford asked the defendant to remain while the 
search of the vehicle was conducted, in case any illegal items 
were found. 
The defendant agreed to stay and stood outside in the cold for 
ufive minutes at the most77 while officers searched the 
vehicle. Officer Lunceford testified that is was uextremely 
cold" that early February morning. 
The defendant had a cell phone and used that phone to make 
2 
phone calls. 
11. Officer Lunceford asked the defendant if she wanted to sit in 
the back seat of the Springville officer's vehicle while the 
search was conducted. The defendant accepted the offer. 
12. Officer Lunceford also told the defendant that officers would 
"transport [her] to wherever [she] need[ed] to go" after they 
were finished. 
13. Officer Lunceford did not know whether the back doors of the 
Springville patrol car could be opened from the inside, 
although he believed that it could not. 
14. While the defendant sat in the patrol car she was permitted 
to, and did, make phone calls. 
15. No illegal substances were found in the search of the vehicle. 
16. After the search was completed, Officer Lunceford went to the 
Springville patrol car and spoke with the defendant. 
17. During this conversation the defendant sat in the patrol car 
and the officer held the door open and stood outside while he 
spoke with the defendant. 
18. Officer Lunceford told the defendant that she was "welcome to 
go at any time" if she wanted to leave the scene on foot. He 
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also informed her that the officers had not found any illegal 
items during the search. 
Because neither the driver nor the defendant were the 
registered owner of the vehicle, the officer did not allow her 
to take the vehicle after the search was completed. 
Officer Lunceford noticed that the defendant was nervous, was 
moving quickly, and that she had some sores on her fact that 
were scabbed over. Based on the officer's training and 
experience, these were all indications of drug use. 
Officer Lunceford then asked the defendant if there was anyone 
he could call on her behalf, or if she wanted to walk back to 
the house from which he had seen the vehicle pull away. 
The defendant indicated that she had attempted to call the 
people at the house from which she had come, but there was no 
answer. Further, she indicated that the residents would not 
open the door if she went there. 
Officer Lunceford asked the defendant if she used 
methamphetamine. 
The defendant denied using drugs. 
Officer Lunceford told the defendant about his experience with 
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drug users and told her that what he observed in her that led 
him to believe that she was using drugs. He then asked her if 
she had any methamphetamine with her or if there was any in 
the vehicle. 
26. The defendant admitted that she had methamphetamine in her 
purse. 
27. Officer Lunceford then asked the defendant to step out of the 
patrol car, which she did. 
28. The officer then asked the defendant for permission to search 
her purse, which she granted. 
29. In the defendant's purse, the officer found a glass pipe with 
burnt residue and a small baggie containing a white crystal 
substance that tested positive for methamphetamine. 
30. At no time during the encounter did Officer Lunceford inform 
the defendant of her rights pursuant to Miranda. 
31. Officer Lunceford was in his uniform, including his side arm. 
32. The vehicle was stopped in the middle of an intersection. 
33. The flashing lights of all the police vehicles remained on 
during the search of the vehicle and the conversation with the 
defendant. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The site of the questioning was not indicative of custody, 
since the defendant was told she could leave. 
2. When Officer Lunceford first approached the defendant the 
driver, not the defendant was the focus of the investigation. 
3. After noticing signs of methamphetamine use, the officer's 
focus shifted to the defendant. 
4. There was no objective indicia of arrest to show that the 
defendant was in custody. 
5. The length of the questioning was brief and investigatory, not 
accusatory. 
6. The defendant voluntarily stayed at the scene after being 
informed that she was free to leave. 
7. The defendant's freedom was not restricted to the degree of 
formal arrest, so no Miranda warnings were required before the 
officer spoke with the defendant. 
8. The defendant voluntarily consented to the search of her purse. 
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ORDER 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED this day of , 2004 
3GE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT JUDGE 
n 
V»v^n-****** ? 
Ant hony^Sowe 11 
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m THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LORI SMITH, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Date July 7, 2004 
Case No 041400736 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Division 2 
This matter comes before the Court upon defendant's Motion to Suppress which was fully 
briefed and submitted on May 28, 2004. Having considered the memoranda and arguments of the 
parties the Court now enters the following ruling.1 
FACTS 
1. On February 12, 2004, Mapleton police officer Tony Luxford ("Officer Luxford") 
stopped a vehicle after he had witnessed at least two instances of improper lane travel. 
2. There were two occupants of the vehicle: the driver and the defendant, who was seated 
in the front passenger seat. 
3. A routine warrants check on the driver showed that he had a valid warrant of arrest. 
4. The vehicle was not registered to either the driver or the defendant. 
5 Officer Luxford arrested the driver because of the warrant and placed the driver in the 
back seat of his patrol car. 
6. Back-up patrol cars arrived on the scene, one of which was a Springville patrol car 
^ 1 facts are taken from the transcript of the preliminary hearing on 25 March 2004. 
Officer Tony Luxford of the Mapleton City Police Department was the only witness for the 
prosecution. The defendant offered no witnesses and chose not to testify on her own behalf. 
1 
7 Officer Luxford returned to the vehicle to conduct a search incident to arrest and he 
asked defendant to step out of the vehicle. 
8 Officer Luxford asked defendant to stay while the search was being conducted in case 
any illegal items were found. 
9 Defendant agreed to stay and stood outside in the cold for "five minutes at the most" 
while the officers conducted a search of the car. According to the officer, it was "extremely 
cold" that early February morning. 
10 Defendant had a cell phone in her possession that she used to make phone calls. 
11 Officer Luxford asked defendant if she wanted to sit in the back seat of the Springville 
patrol car while the search was conducted, defendant accepted. 
12 He also told her that the police officers would "transport [her] to wherever [she] 
nee[ed] to go" after they were finished at the scene. 
13 Officer Luxford testified that he did not know whether back doors of the Springville 
patrol car could be opened from the inside. 
14. While defendant sat in the back seat of the Springville patrol car she was permitted to 
and did make telephone calls. 
15 No illegal substances were found during the search of the car. 
16 After the search was completed, Officer Luxford went to the Springville patrol car to 
speak with defendant. 
17. During this conversation defendant sat in the patrol car and Officer Luxford held the 
door open and stood outside while he spoke to her. 
n n n t o 
18. Officer Luxford told defendant that she was "welcome to go at any time" if she 
wanted to leave the scene on foot. He also told her that nothing illegal was found in the vehicle. 
19. Because neither defendant nor the driver was the registered owner of the vehicle, he 
did not allow her to take the vehicle after the search was completed. 
20. Officer Luxford noticed that defendant seemed nervous, moved quickly, and had 
some sores on her face that were not quite scabbed over. Based upon his experience as a police 
officer, these factors were consistent with drug usage. 
21. Officer Luxford then asked defendant whether there was anyone he could call for 
defendant or whether she wanted to walk back to a nearby house from which he had seen the 
vehicle pull away. 
22. Defendant replied that she had tried to call the people at that house, but that there 
was no answer. She stated that they wouldn't answer the door if she went there. 
23. Officer Luxford asked defendant if she used methamphetamine. 
24. Defendant denied using the drug. 
25. Officer Luxford told her about his experience with drug usage and what he had 
noticed about her that lead him to believe that she was using drugs. He then asked if she had any 
methamphetamine with her or if there was any in the vehicle. 
24. Defendant admitted that there was methamphetamine in her purse. 
25. Officer Luxford asked her to step out of the Springville patrol car, which she did. 
26. He then asked permission to search her purse and she consented. 
27. In the defendant's purse Officer Luxford found a glass pipe with burnt residue and a 
small baggy containing a white crystal substance that tested positive for methamphetamine 
28. At no time in his conversations with the defendant did Officer Luxford advise her of 
her rights under Miranda2 
29. Officer Luxford was in uniform and had his sidearm with him. 
30. The flashing lights of all of the police cars remained on during the search of the car 
and the conversation with defendant. 
31. The vehicle was stopped in the middle of an intersection. 
DISCUSSION 
Defendant moves this Court to suppress the evidence found in her purse, namely the glass 
pipe with burnt residue and the small baggy containing-a white crystal substance, claiming that the 
search was unlawful for one of two alternative reasons. First, defendant argues that defendant 
was not advised of'herMiranda rights prior to Officer Luxford5s questioning and, second, 
defendant argues that the consent she gave to the officer to search her purse was invalid and 
improperly obtained. If either argument is successful, defendant asks that the evidence be 
suppressed according to the exclusionary rule: "The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred 
from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful 
invasion." Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). Also, defendant's testimonial 
statements may be suppressed if "they were the product of coercion, if Miranda warnings were 
2SeeMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
4 
not given, or if there was a violation of the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)."3 
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S 14, 20 (1990). 
Miranda rights advisement is required if the person is both in the custody of the police and 
the person is being subjected to interrogation. See Miranda at 467. If either of these factors is 
not present, then the Miranda protections do not apply. In this case, there is no dispute that 
defendant was not read her Miranda rights. However, this fact alone does not invalidate the 
search; the State argues that defendant was not entitled to Miranda warnings because she did not 
experience custodial interrogation, while the defendant argues that she was in custody and was 
not free to leave. 
"Custodial interrogation" has been explained as "questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action 
in any significant way." Id at 444. A suspect is considered to be "in custody" when the suspect's 
"freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 
468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). This test has also been described as a determination of whether the 
suspect feels "free to leave" the interrogation. See U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); 
Utah v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996). The Utah Supreme Court has identified five 
factors that a court should use to determine whether a suspect's freedom is restricted to the 
degree of formal arrest: "(1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the 
3This case stands for the proposition that after an accused requests the aid of counsel all 
interrogation must stop until counsel is present or unless the accused initiates the questioning. 
See Id at 484-485. 
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accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present;... (4) the length and form of 
interrogation; and (5) whether the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and 
willingly." State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652-53 (Utah 1992) (internal quotations omitted). The 
Mincy Court further stated: 
If the questioning is merely investigatory, courts have not found custody. . . 
However, when investigatory questioning shifts to accusatory questioning, custody 
is likely and Miranda warnings become necessary. The change from investigatory 
to accusatory questioning occurs when the "police have reasonable grounds to 
believe that a crime has been committed and also reasonable grounds to believe 
that the defendant committed it." Id. (Internal citations omitted.) 
The Court will consider each of these factors in turn. 
Was the site of the questioning indicative of custody? During the first five minutes of the 
search of the vehicle the defendant stood outside in the cold early morning Febmary air. She then 
accepted the officer's invitation to sit in the warmer back seat of the Springville patrol car with 
the door closed No testimony was offered to the Court regarding her inability to leave the car 
due to a locked door or any failed attempts on her part to leave the police car. When Officer 
Luxford began to talk with defendant and to question her, the patrol car door was open and she 
was told that she could walk anywhere she wished. Although the site of the conversation was the 
back seat of a police patrol car, the Court finds that this factor does not point toward 
interrogation. Defendant's ability to leave the site was not impeded by Officer Luxford, as she 
chose to remain in the car after he informed her that she could leave and she chose to continue the 
conversation with him 
Did the investigation focus on defendant? Until Officer Luxford approached defendant as 
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she sat in the back of the Springville officer's patrol car, the focus of the investigation had been 
arrest of the driver of the vehicle and the subsequent search of the vehicle. Although the officer 
had asked defendant to remain during the search, upon completion of the search, Officer Luxford 
approached the defendant where she sat in the patrol car and informed her that nothing had been 
found in the search and that she was free to leave. At this point, the officer noticed what he 
believed were indicia of drug use and changed the focus of his investigation to defendant by 
asking her whether she used drugs and whether she had any drugs in her possession. Certainly, as 
he talked to her very briefly about possible drug use, the defendant became the focus of his 
investigation. The Court finds that this factor does, indeed, point toward the possibility of 
custodial interrogation. 
Were objective indicia of arrest present during defendant's conversation with the officer? 
It is clear that there was an obvious police presence at the scene of this conversation. While 
Officer Luxford was questioning the defendant, he was dressed in uniform and wore a sidearm; in 
addition, the flashing lights of all of the patrol cars were turned on. However, at the time he 
began questioning defendant about possible drug use, the visual factors listed above had 
everything to do with the driver's arrest and nothing to do with defendant. She had just been 
informed that, despite the flashing lights and the officer's presence, she was free to leave.4 At that 
4The Court views the defendant's position at this point in the chronology as similar to that 
of a passenger/witness sitting in a patrol car after a traffic accident. The witness, perhaps having 
filled out a written statement, would certainly feel free to leave, having been informed that the 
driver had been arrested for a warrant and that a search of the car had revealed no evidence of 
concern. The flashing lights and the officer's uniform and sidearm would not, under those 
analogous circumstances, have amounted to indicia of arrest. 
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point, none of the factors in play constituted custodial or control tactics over the defendant. In 
Salt Lake City v. Carrier, the court described the indicia of arrest as "readied handcuffs, locked 
doors or drawn guns." 664 p.2d 1168, 1171 (1983). In addition, the "environment may have 
been authoritative but it certainly was not coercive or compelling." Id. Clearly none of these 
indicia attended Officer Luxford's questioning of defendant, as defendant was not placed in 
handcuffs or guarded by other officers, she was told she was free to walk away from the scene, 
and her movements were physically unrestricted. The Court finds that there were no objective 
indicia of arrest that support a finding that defendant was in custody. 
Do the length of the conversation between the officer and the defendant and the form of 
the questions contribute to a finding of custodial interrogation? According to the testimony at the 
preliminary hearing, Officer Luxford asked defendant four questions: if she used 
methamphetamine; if she had any drugs in her possession; if she would please get out of the car, 
and if he was allowed to search her purse. The questioning took only a few minutes, while the 
form of the questioning included only two direct questions about defendant's drug usage. The 
Mincy case carefully considered whether such questioning was investigatory or accusatory. See 
838 P.2d at 653. Investigatory questioning is not an element of custodial investigation, but "when 
investigatory questioning shifts to accusatory questions, custody is likely and Miranda warnings 
become necessary." See Id. Officer Luxford asked if defendant was using drugs and when she 
said no, he explained that some of her behavior was consistent with drug usage and further asked 
if she had any drugs with her. This type of questioning was a non-accusatory effort to investigate 
the possibility of a crime having been committed. The Court finds that this factor-the length and 
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form of interrogation—favors a finding that the defendant was not in custody. 
Lastly, did the defendant come to the place of interrogation freely and willingly? It is very 
clear that defendant voluntarily stayed outside in the cold February air for about five minutes after 
Officer Luxford asked her to stay during the search of the vehicle. He then asked if she wanted to 
sit in the patrol car where it was warmer, and she agreed. At all times defendant was in 
possession of her cell phone and was not restricted in her use of the phone. She was told that she 
could leave after the vehicle was searched, and nothing was done to physically restrain her from 
leaving. In fact, just prior to questioning, Officer Luxford opened the back door of the Springville 
patrol car and reminded defendant she was free to walk away. The Court finds that nothing in the 
facts persuades the Court that the defendant did not remain in the Springville patrol car 
voluntarily. She went to the Springville patrol car freely and willingly and also remained in the 
same car during the conversation with Officer Luxford equally freely and willingly. 
The Court finds that four of the five factors described mMincy support a finding that 
defendant was not subjected to "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after [she] had 
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of [her] freedom of action in any significant way." 
Mincy at 444. Defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation and, therefore, Officer 
Luxford was not required to read the defendant her Miranda rights before Officer Luxford began 
to question her. The Court will not suppress defendant's verbal responses to the officer's four 
questions and will not suppress the physical evidence found in her purse for lack of Miranda 
advisement. The Court denies the motion with regard to the above arguments. 
Defendant next argues that the search was unreasonable because defendant's consent to 
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search her purse was not properly obtained First, based upon the facts presented at the 
preliminary hearing, the Court finds that defendant did verbally consent to the search of her purse. 
The more challenging determination is whether defendant's consent was valid - whether it was 
voluntarily given. 
Voluntariness is determined by a "totality of the circumstances test, and the burden of 
proof is by preponderance of the evidence." State v. Hansen, 63 P 3d 650, 664 (Utah 2002). 
The Court will examine the testimony given at the preliminary hearing and will consider whether 
defendant was able to and did consent to the search without the pressure of duress or coercion. 
Officer Luxford asked defendant whether she had any methamphetamine in her possession, 
and defendant responded that she had some in her purse. Officer Luxford asked defendant to exit 
the car, and she exited the car carrying her purse. Officer Luxford next asked if he could search 
defendant's purse, and she consented, which was when the officer found the glass pipe and the 
baggy with methamphetamine in it. At no time did Officer Luxford attempt to deceive or trick 
defendant into giving her consent; he did not threaten that he would search the purse without her 
consent, nor did he threaten her in any other way. He did not claim authority to search her purse, 
but asked permission after defendant admitted what was in the purse. The period of questioning 
was brief and was not demanding, nor were the questions repeated. The Court finds through 
analysis of the above facts and by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant did give consent 
voluntarily. 
Even though defendant was sitting in a patrol car and was speaking to a uniformed and 
armed police officer, the Court finds that, after considering the totality of the circumstances, 
10 
defendant was not coerced into giving her consent The Court denies the motion to suppress as 
to the consent issue 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied The Court orders the State to prepare 
appropriate findings, conclusions and order 
^ 
DATED this 1_ day of July, 2004 
Case No 041400736 
Claudia Layco 
District Court Judge f ~*£ 
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Thursday, March 25, 2004 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Lori Smith. Let's 
have that prelim. 
And Ms. O'Bryant, do you want to call your first 
witness? 
you are 
MS. O'BRYANT: Yes. The State calls Officer Luxford. 
THE COURT: Come up and be sworn in. 
TONY LUXFORD 
Called by the State, having been duly 
Sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
THE WITNESS: yes. 
THE COURT: Please come up and have a seat. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. O'BRYANT: State your name and occupation. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Tony Luxford, officer for Mapleton Police department. 
How long have you been a peace officer? 
Approximately four years. 
Were you on duty on February 12tn of 2004? 
Yes. 
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Q. And on that date did you stop a vehicle in which the 
defendant was a passenger? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Can you just briefly describe the circumstances of i 
that stop. 
A. Original stop was for improper lane travel. 1 had 
witnessed the vehicle off the side of the road. It was early 
morning. It brought my attention. 1 had passed it, watched 
it pull into a house. Watched it leave again, and improper 
lane travel as well. Driving on the wrong side of the road. 
1 then initiated the traffic stop. Routine check of the 
driver came back with a valid warrant. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
So did you arrest the driver on that warrant? 
1 did. 
Were there any other individuals in the vehicle? 
There was. 
How many? 
One. 
And who was that individual? 
It would be the defendant. 
And did you get a name? 
Yes, Lori Smith. 
How did you identify her? 
Just by name, date of birth. 
Did you search the vehicle incident to the arrest? 
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A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What did you have Ms. Smith do while you were 
searching? 
A. I had her step out of the vehicle. It was quite cold 
that night. I asked her if she wished to sit in the officer's 
patrol vehicle, and she said she would. 
Q. And did she? 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. Did you notice anything unusual or unusual about 
Ms. Smith that caused you concern? 
A. She seemed somewhat nervous. Her movements were 
quite fast. I noticed some sores on her face not quite 
scabbed over. Just things I found consistent with certain 
types of drug usage. 
Q. Is that based upon your training and experience as a 
peace officer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you speak with Ms. Smith? 
A. Yes, i did. 
Q. And what was your conversation with her? 
A. I asked her after the arrest had been completed and 
the driver had been placed in my vehicle, I asked her if there 
was anybody we could call. She was allowed to use her cell 
phone, while she was in the car, to call people. I asked her 
if she wanted to walk back to the house where she was at. She 
said she had tried to call and there was no answer. They 
wouldn't answer the door if she went there. During that time 
I asked her, with my observations. If she used 
methamphetamine. And she stated, "No." I then asked her 
again, explained my experience with it, and asked her if she 
hadn't or knew if there was any in the vehicle or on her. And 
she said, "There's some in my purse." I then asked her, "What 
was in her purse." And she stated, "Meth." 
Q. Okay, what did you do after she gave you that 
information? 
A. I asked her to exit the car. She did have her purse 
with her in the car. I asked her if I could search her purse. 
And she did give me her consent. 
MS. O'BRYANT: May I approach? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. (BY MS. O'BRYANT) I'm handing you state's exhibits 1 and 
2. Can you identify those? 
A. The first is a glass pipe with residue, burnt residue 
on the ends. It was located in her purse. 
The second is a small baggy with white crystal substance 
that was tested at the jail, and testes positive for 
methamphetamine. 
Q. Who tested that? 
A. I did. 
MS. O'BRYANT: The State would move to admit exhibits 
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1 and 2. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. HOWELL: No objection. 
THE COURT: They're received. 
(State's Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2 
Were received into evidence.) 
MR. LOW: That's all the questions the State has. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOWELL: 
Q. Afternoon, Officer. So I'm clear. The vehicle was 
traveling on the wrong side of the road? 
A. Originally the first observation of the vehicle was 
off to the side of the road, emergency lane, traveling about 
five to 10 miles an hour. As I passed it my intention was to 
turn around. By the time I had turned around, this vehicle 
had pulled into a driveway, shortly, just half a block from 
the intersection. 
Q. Were there any minimum speed limits on the road? 
A. The speed limit is 50 miles an hour there. No 
traffic whatsoever at that time. 
Q. No minimum speed limit, it was not against the law to 
travel five miles an hour? 
A. No. 
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Q. 
lane? 
A. 
Q. 
license. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
As you said, they were traveling in the emergency 
Yes. 
So you pulled up behind them. Get Mr. Smith's 
Run it. He had a warrant. Is that correct? 
Yes. 1 
You placed him under arrest? 
Yes. | 
Took him back to the police car? 
Yes. 
You asked, if 1 understand right, you asked Ms. Smith 
to get out of the vehicle so you could search it incident to 
arrest? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
Put her in the back of the patrol vehicle? j 
Originally she stood out there. It was extremely 
cold. 1 asked her if she wished to go back to the other 
officer's car and she said, "Yes." 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
How long was she standing outside would you say? 
1 would say maybe five minutes at the most. 
That's not in your police report though, is it? 
It's not. 
Well, in the police report you just indicated you 
placed her in the back of the patrol vehicle? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
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Q. When you searched the vehicle you didn't find any 
incriminating evidence? Any contraband? | 
A. No. 
Q. It was clean? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had a drug sniff done of the car; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. There was a canine in the area. 
Q. Just out of curiosity, how long did all of this take? 
A. 1 would say from original arrest through the complete 
search, maybe 20 minutes, 25 minutes. 
Q. Okay. Did you perform a terry frisk on Ms. Smith 
before placing her in the back of the vehicle? 
A. No. 
Q. Just out of curiosity, can you, if you're in the back 
of your patrol vehicle, can you open the door from the inside? 
A. Mine you cannot. She was placed in a Springville 
officer's vehicle. And that one, I'm not sure. 1 would dare 
say no, but 1 wouldn't know. 
Q. 1 don't know this for sure, but are most patrol 
vehicles -- can you exit the interior from the back seat? 
A. Usually not. 
Q. That door is generally inoperable from the inside? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So after conducting a search of the car and 
finding nothing, you got into your patrol vehicle and began to 
question Ms. Smith? 
A. I had walked back. Explained to her nothing was 
found in the vehicle. I explained to her that she has the 
option of making phone calls. She was allowed to have her 
cell phone the whole time, which she had, which she was using 
almost the entire time. 
Q. Again, none of that is in the police report, is it? 
A. No, it's not. 
Q. But at this time she was in the back of the patrol 
vehicle? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were in the front seat? 
A. No, I was outside the vehicle. 
THE COURT: Let me clarify. This is not your patrol 
vehicle she's in at this point. This is the Springville 
officer? 
THE WITNESS: The arrest that I made, I had in my 
vehicle. 
THE COURT: That's Mr. Smith. 
THE WITNESS: Mr. Smith was in my vehicle. 
THE COURT: So this discussion is taking place while 
you're standing outside the Springville officer's vehicle, and 
she's inside of that vehicle? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
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Q (BY MR HOWELL) So I have my visual correct, she's sitting 
in the back of a patrol vehicle Presumably you have the back 
door open talking to her? 
A Yes 
Q Did you read her her Miranda rights7 
A No, I didn't 
Q Just asked her questions without it? 
A Yeah 
Q At any time did you tell her she was free to leave? 
A Most of the time I said, "If you want to walk, you're 
welcome to go at any time" The only time I didn't is in 
between when he was arrested and between the time the vehicle 
was searched in case illegal items were found 
Q You didn't inform her she was free to leave In your 
opinion she was required to stay there while the vehicle was 
being searched 
A While the vehicle was being searched I asked her if 
she would stay there in case any illegal items were found 
Q Did she have a bottle drink in her hand when she was 
placed in the back of the patrol vehicle? 
A I believe so 
Q Was that drink taken away from her at one point? 
A Not by me I'm not sure of the other officer If s 
a good possibility 
Q Were you in your uniform at the time? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes 
Had your sidearm wiih you? 
Yes, I did 
Were the lights going on the police car? 
Yes, they were 
THE COURT Which police car 
THE WITNESS On mine, as well as the back-up 
officers The position of the vehicle placed it right in the 
middle of the intersection where the stop was made 
Q (BY MR HOWELL) I probably asked this But she wasn't 
ever told she was free to go? 
A I wouldn't say I just come out and said "You're free 
to go" I said, "We're conducting an investigation, and we're 
going to search the car, and when you can make phone calls, 
when we're done here we can transport you to wherever you 
need to go" And during that time, maybe two to three times I 
went back and checked her, made sure she was fine — 
Q I'm sorry to interrupt Was she ever told she was 
free to take the car? 
A No 
Q Was she free to take \he car? 
A No 
Q Why was that? 
A It was not registered in her name It was not 
registered as well as in the driver's name 
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MR HOWELL Okay Nothing further 
MS O'BRYANT I have no additional questions 
THE COURT Okay, please be seated 
Any other witnesses? 
MS O'BRYANT We would rest 
THE COURT Any witnesses, Mr Howell? 
MR HOWELL No 
THE COURT Any argument? 
MS O'BRYANT State would submit 
MR HOWELL Submit 
THE COURT For purposes of probable cause, the Court 
will find there was grounds for probable cause There was 
methamphetamine and a glass pipe found in her purse So I 
find there is probable cause 
Where do we want to go from here until I bind-over 
for trial Suppression motion next? 
MR HOWELL Yes, Ma am 
THE COURT All right Are you going to need to get 
a transcript first? 
MR HOWELL I'm pretty sure 
THE COURT How soon can we get a transcript? 
THE COURT REPORTER Tomorrow 
MR HOWELL I can have my motion filed within 10 
days 
THE COURT We'll say 10 business days from tomorrow 
And that would be April 9 l h That would give the State 10 
days, plus the mailing to respond That would be the 26 t h 
of April 
That's two responses I've given you due on that date 
Ms O'Bryant Do you want to leply? 
MR HOWELL I would certainly like to leave it open 
THE COURT Okay should we set this for a 
suppression hearing around — well it would be either 
May 6 th , 20 t h or 27 t h 
MS O'BRYANT Any of those days are fine with the 
State While he's looking, may we withdraw the evidence? 
THE COURT Yes, please do 
MR HOWELL The si>th, 20 t h or 27th? I'll 
choose the 27 t h 
THE COURT We'll sel this for the afternoon of the 
27 th, 2 00 o'clock 27th of May That's way down the line 
Is that okay with you Ms Smith? 
THE DEFENDANT Yes 
THE COURT We'll set this for a suppression hearing 
on that date And we'll have you sign a promise to appear and 
see you then Thank you 
(Proceedings concluded ) 
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